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Supply and Demand of Venture Capital in the U. S.
Abstract
Venture capital is an investment made by specialized organizations in high-growth, high-risk and often
highly technological firms that need capital to finance product development or growth. This sort of
financing is, by nature, mostly in the form of equity rather than debt. The purpose of this paper is to
identify and ascertain the effects of the various exogenous variables that influence the supply and
demand of venture capital.
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Supply and Demand of Venture Capital
in the U.S.
By Sunil Jagwani

I. INTRODUCTION
of the issue reflects all available and relevant inside
Venture capital is an investment made by
information (Meggison & Weiss, 1997). It therespecialized organizations in high-growth, high-risk
fore becomes a matter of great significance that
and often highly technological firms that need capipolicies be made to encourage venture capital actal to finance product detivity in the economy. This
velopment or growth. This
in turn calls for a good unsort of financing is, by naderstanding of the various
Figure 1: Supply and Demand of Venture
ture, mostly in the form of
factors that affect its marCapital
equity rather than debt.
ket. The purpose of this
The capital invested in
paper is to identify and
such fashion usually origiascertain the effects of the
nates from private and
various exogenous varipublic pension funds, enables that influence the
S
dowment funds, foundasupply and demand of ventions, corporations,
ture capital. Section II
wealthy individuals, and
will provide a theoretical
foreign investors.
background of the supply
The venture capiand demand of venture
tal market in the U.S. is
capital, and the various exD
known for its vibrancy and
ogenous factors that may
success in fueling the
affect the market. Section
economy. Some of the bigIII builds upon the various
gest players in many intheories and sets up the
dustries received their initial impetus from these
empirical model. Section IV analyzes the results of
venture capital funds. In fact, countries like Japan
the statistical tests that are run on the model. Fiand the UK have attempted to model their own vennally, Section V presents some policy implications
ture capital industries after the United States
based upon the findings of the study and provides
(Rodney Clark, 1987). Venture capital is also an
suggestions for future research.
important catalyst in the development, implementation and commercialization of new technology—
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
even creating entirely new industries, including bioA. The Supply and Demand Model for Venture
technology and overnight shipping. Some of
Capital
America’s most successful companies grew with the
To understand the various mechanisms by
help of venture funding—Intel, DEC, Apple,
which the different factors influence venture capiMicrosoft, Sun Microsystems, FedEx, Genentech,
tal activity, it is important to discuss its quantity
and Netscape, to name a few. (Venture One)
and price under a supply-demand framework. In
Venture capital institutions perform another
Figure 1, the supply curve represents the willingimportant role. Their presence as investors in a comness of institutions and individuals to supply venpany going public can certify that the offering price
ture capital as a function of the rate of return on the
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investment. A higher rate of return leads to a greater
desire to supply capital. Thus, as in most cases, this
is an upward-sloping supply curve. The demand
schedule represents the volume of venture capital
demanded by firms/entrepreneurs at a given expected rate of return. Here, the rate of return demanded by the suppliers of the venture capital investments is the price of borrowing these funds for
those who demand it. A higher rate of return therefore, reduces the number of firms that are willing or
able to borrow capital at that rate, leading to a downward sloping demand curve.
By construction, the point of intersection of
the supply and demand curves represents the equilibrium price of venture capital. However, returns
from venture capital investments are generally obtained a few years after the initial investment, when
the firm is taken public, or gets bought out. Such
events give the venture investors a chance to exit
from their investments and cash-in on the returns.
Until that event occurs, the firm is valued only at
cost. This measure, however, fails to account for
the intrinsic value of the firm, rendering it useless
as a measure of the anticipated return on venture
capital investments. Gompers and Lerner also point
out that the reporting and accounting practices of
the various venture capital organizations differ considerably, further complicating the task of measuring the anticipated returns on venture investments
(1997).
The important thing to note about the venture capital industry is that both the suppliers and
the demanders of venture capital are ultimately motivated by profit. Therefore, the factors that influence venture capital activity usually do so via their
influence on the expected profit (anticipated rate of
return) from the venture. Given this framework, the
following section discusses the major exogenous
factors that influence these expectations of profit
from venture investments, thus affecting the market for venture capital. For each variable, economic
theory is used to predict and estimate the nature of
its effect.
B. Factors Influencing the Market
1. Industry and Market Performance
Industry performance has historically

proven to be extremely important in attracting more
participants and capital into any industry. This can
be explained by the basic principle of profit maximization, which dictates that individuals seek to
participate in economic activities with a motivation
of earning profit. As a result, the industry that exhibits a high probability of profit, ceteris paribus,
generates more interest and attracts more investment. Accordingly, the performance of the venture
capital industry also has an impact on the supply
and demand of venture capital. Better returns in the
venture industry tend to generate more demand and
attract more supply of venture capital. On the other
hand, poor performance (in terms of returns) depresses venture capital activity.1
Another related factor that works in conjunction with industry performance is the overall
performance of capital markets. This is a direct result of the fact that most of the aforesaid gains made
on a venture investment come from an initial public offering (IPO) and that the success of an IPO, in
turn, is inextricably connected with the health of
the capital markets (Venture Economics, 1988). A
healthy stock market also facilitates the creation of
liquidity in the venture sector, thus encouraging contributions. Black and Gilson also find in their research that growing and robust capital markets positively effect the venture capital industry.
2. Capital Gains Tax (CGT)
There has been considerable empirical evidence regarding the effects of capital gains taxes on
venture capital activity. Venture capital activity and
funding rose dramatically after the capital gains tax
cuts of 1978 and 1981. Also, since the capital gains
rate hike in 1986, the rate of venture capital investing has been rather stable in the U.S. Meanwhile, it
has increased rapidly in other parts of the world.
This capital gains rate hike, therefore, has in effect
caused negative growth in venture capital funding
in the U.S. Poterba considers these correlations to
be sufficient to hypothesize a negative relationship
between the capital gains tax rates and the level of
venture capital funding.
According to this hypothesis, the capital
gains tax has a two-sided effect. Changes in capital
gains tax rates alter the expected profits from such
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ventures for both the suppliers and the demanders.
On the one hand, a reduction in the capital gains
tax raises the supply of venture capital by increasing the after tax returns in assets that yield capital
gains, reducing the required rate of pre-tax return.
This causes a right-shift in the supply curve (Figure
1). On the other hand, a reduction in the tax rate
increases the demand for venture capital funds by
increasing the number of individuals that initiate
start-ups, and making it easier for them to attract
employees. In addition, capital gains income can
be made more attractive to those entrepreneurs that
are considering forgoing wage income to engage in
private ventures. Consequently, there is a right-shift
in the demand schedule for venture capital (Figure 1).
It is important to note that differential taxtreatment of venture investors and entrepreneurs is
possible, since the two classes of people can easily
be distinguished. Therefore, to formulate tax policies that are efficient, it is important to analyze the
magnitude of influence that capital gains taxation
has on the suppliers (venture investors) and demanders (entrepreneurs). Only after studying its effects
on the two sub-groups can we formulate policies
that effectively encourage venture capital. This differential will also be further analyzed using the empirical model.

3. Research and Development
As pointed out in the introduction, venture
capital investments are often made in high-growth,
high-risk ventures that are often highly technological in nature. Landscroner and Paroush (1995) explain that venture capital firms play a crucial role
in commercializing new technologies (technologies
that are still in the nascent stages of development).
New technologies tend to open up new markets and
new opportunities for profit, seducing individual and
institutional venture capitalists as well as entrepreneurs. In turn, the flow of funds from the suppliers
of venture capital helps fund further research in these
new technologies. This theory, therefore, suggests a
strong positive link between R&D expenditures and
venture capital activity. It is important to also mention that this does not necessarily imply causation
in one way or the other. The relationship between
R&D and venture capital funding appears to be more
symbiotic in nature, where they both mutually benefit from each other. Moreover, Lerner and Gompers
found that spending on Research and Development
had a significant positive impact on venture capital
activity at the state-level (1998). According to them,
high R&D expenditures indicate a high number of
“potential entrepreneurs with promising ideas.” The
R&D variable could also potentially capture the

Figure 2: Venture Capital Investments and the Mximum Statutory Long Term Capital Gains
Tax Rate for High-Income Tax Payers

92

The Park Place Economist / vol. VIII

Supply and Demand of V
entur
Ventur
enturee Capital in the U.S.
demand effects of high-technology firms. It would
therefore be reasonable to hypothesize that increased
R&D spending creates a similar effect at the aggregate level.
4. Interest Rates
Basic macroeconomic theory suggests that
debt instruments are an alternative to equity investments, which includes venture capital investments.
Thus, if interest rates (returns on credit given) rise,
the relative attractiveness of investing in venture
capital funds would likely deteriorate, ceteris paribus. This would decrease the willingness of investors to supply venture capital at all prices, i.e., all
expected return levels. Since the decision to invest
is generally based upon past performance of the
various alternatives, the previous year’s performance of interest rate will be used as a comparative
standard. In other words, the interest rates variable
will be lagged. These are the major factors that are
predicted to affect the supply and demand for venture capital in the US. In the following section, we
will discuss the various proxies that are used in the
model to account for these factors.
III. EMPIRICAL MODEL
The data set for the empirical model consists of a time series. The model is set up as an OLS
model in which the dependent variable measures
venture capital activity. The explanatory variables
include proxies to capture the effects of the various
factors discussed in the previous section. Following
is a list of variables used in the model.
A.Venture Capital Commitments
(VC_COMMIT)
This is the dependent variable in the model
and is used as a proxy for the venture capital activity in the U.S. in a given year. It measures the total
amount of commitments made by the venture capital industry in a given year. The commitments made
in a given year usually span across many years. For
instance, a venture capitalist might commit to providing a venture with $10 million over the next four
years, although the actual funds defrayed may only
be $2.5 million in the first year, $3 million in the
second year, and so on. Tracking actual venture

capital payments made in a given year would therefore reflect past commitments. Instead, the commitments made in a given year more accurately reflect the sentiments of the investors and the market
for venture capital. Therefore, it is a reasonable
measure of venture capital activity in a given year.
The data was obtained from the Venture Economics database and various issues of the Venture Capital Journal.
B. Industry and Market Performance
(IND_PERF)
To measure the effect of industry performance, some type of a handle on returns on venture
capital investments is needed. Unfortunately, as
pointed out before, estimating the price of venture
capital is difficult, given the long-term nature of its
payoffs. As a proxy, the model uses the amount of
money raised by the IPOs of venture capital-backed
firms in a certain year. Based on the theory described
in Section II.B.1, the predicted effect of this variable on VC_COMMIT should be positive. This
measure is a suitable proxy for the performance of
(returns on) venture capital investments because the
bulk of the profits on a venture investment are made
by taking the firm public (Venture Economics,
1988). Almost 96% of the IPOs and only 59% of
the acquisitions provided positive returns on investments for the venture capitalists (Venture Capital
Journal2).
A separate Venture Economics study done
in 1998 found that $1.00 invested in a firm that
goes public provides an average cash return of $1.95
over the initial investment with an average holding
period of 4.2 years. Compare this with the next
best option, which is the acquisition of the firm that
the money was invested in. In this case, the return
is only 40 cents over a mean holding period of 3.7
years. This proxy also captures the effects of the
performance of the markets in general because the
valuation and pricing of an IPO is strongly correlated with the prevalent market conditions (Gompers
and Lerner, 1999). The data was obtained from
The Venture Capital Cycle (Gompers and Lerner,
1999).
C. Capital Gains Tax Rate (CAP_GAINS)
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This was measured using the Maximum
Statutory Long term Capital Gains Tax Rate for
high-income tax payers as determined by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). As the theory suggests,
this variable can be expected to have a negative relationship with VC_COMMIT. The data was obtained from the IRS database.

rates in the financial market. A negative relationship is suggested between this variable and
VC_COMMIT by the theory discussed in Section
II.B.4. The data was obtained from the Economagic
database. Table 1 summarizes the information on
the different variables.
The OLS model is set up as follows:

D. Research and Development Spending (R&D)
The proxy used to measure the influence of
Research and Development is national expenditures
for R&D as a percentage of gross domestic product
(GDP), as reported by the National Science Foundation (NSF). The advantage of using this variable
is that it provides a built-in control for the overall
economic situation by incorporating GDP in its calculation. This variable is expected to have a positive relationship with venture capital commitments
because of the reasons described in Section II.B.3.
The data was computed using data obtained from
the NSF homepage.

VC_COMMIT = a + ß 1 IND_PERF +
ß2CAP_GAINS + ß3R&D + ß4INT_RATE + ý

E. Interest Rates (INT_RATE)
The lagged 30 year T-bill Constant Maturity Rate
is used as a proxy to measure the prevalent interest

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS
Data from 1978 to 1995 was used in the
model described in Section III. Table 2 shows the
results obtained. The adjusted R2 was 65.11% and
all the variables had the predicted signs. In terms of
significance, two of the four variables were significant at the 95% level of confidence. These variables were CAP_GAINS and INT_RATE.
A second regression was run with the R&D
variable lagged. This was done with the reasoning
that the spending done on R&D in a given year is
more likely to influence venture capital demand and
supply in the following year(s). The results are
shown in Table 3.

Table 1: Summary Description of Variables
Used in OLS Model

94

Variable Name

Description

VC_COMMIT

Venture Capital Activity measured by
the amount of money raised in
Commitments in the given year.

IND_PERF

Industry performance measured by
the total amount raised by venturebacked IPOs in the market.

+

CAP_GAINS

Max. Statutory Long term Capital
Gains Tax Rate for high- income tax
payers

-

R&D

Total R&D expenditure as a
percentage of the GDP in the given
year.

+

INT_RATE

30 Yr. T- bill rate (lagged)

-
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Table 2: Regression Results
Regression Statistics
Multiple R

0.851240136

R Square

0.724609768

Adjusted R
Square

0.651172373

Standard
Error

1614.340511

Observations

20

ANOVA
df

SS

MS

F

Significance F

Regression

4

102857793.3

25714448.3

9.86704073

0 . 0 0 0 4 0 5 6 33

Residual

15

39091429.27

2606095.2 8

Total

19

141949222.6

Coefficients

Standard
Error

t Stat

P- value

Intercept

23931.00834

8471.309805

2.8249478 4

0.01279856

IND_PERF

0.242951537

0.15017403

1.61779994

0.12653641

CAP_GAINS - 602.587606

133.3227304

- 4.5197665

0.00040695

R&D

1606.275325

2077.726642

0.7730927 1

0.45147902

INT_RATE

- 1036.610091 300.8904369

- 3.4451414

0.00360763
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Table 3: Regression Results (R&D lagged)
Regression Statistics
Multiple R

0.850963

R Square

0.724138

Adjusted R
Square

0.64532

Standard
Error

1594.153

Observations

19

ANOVA
df

SS

MS

F

Significance F

Regression

4

9 3 3 9 3 6 53

2 3 3 4 8 4 13

9.187498

0 . 0 0 0 7 38

Residual

14

35578544

2541325

Total

18

1.29E+08

Coefficients

Standard
Error

t Stat

P- value

Lower 95%

Intercept

23821.07

8289.283

2 . 8 7 3 7 19

0.012262

6 0 4 2 . 3 06

IND_PERF

0.277683

0.14776

1.879289

0.081182

- 0 . 0 3 9 23

CAP_GAINS - 672.13

143.1736

- 4.6945 1

0.000345

- 9 7 9 . 2 07

R&D

2215.686

1961.902

1.129356

0.277727

- 1992.18

INT_RATE

- 1023.86

303.1581

- 3.3773 3

0 . 0 0 4 5 12

- 1674.07

Table 4: Comparison of the Beta values of CAP_GAINS
on Taxable and Non-Taxable Commitments
Taxable Commitments

Non- taxable Commitments

CAP_GAINS ß = - 0.16682 CAP_GAINS ß = - 0.13037
p- value: 0.0017707
p- value: 0.008117
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Although one observation was lost in the
process, IND_PERF (industry and market performance) became significant at the 90% level of confidence. R&D also gained some significance. The
signs remained as predicted for all the variables.
The next regressions slightly modify the
original model to further analyze the effects of capital gains tax on venture capital in light of its differential tax-treatment mentioned in Section B.2. A
log-lin model was used instead of the standard OLS
test to study the taxable commitments (commitments
by individuals) and non-taxable commitments (commitments by pension funds). The equations are as
follows:
ln(TAXABLE) = a + ß 1 IND_PERF +
ß2CAP_GAINS + ß3R&D + ß4INT_RATE + ý
ln(NONTAXABLE) = a + ß1IND_PERF +
ß2CAP_GAINS + ß3R&D + ß4INT_RATE + ý
The log-lin model was used so that the results could be standardized across the two subgroups of investors. With this model, the coefficients can be interpreted as relative changes in commitments due to an absolute change the explanatory variables.
If capital gains taxation has a stronger effect on the suppliers, then CAP_GAINS would be
expected to have a significantly stronger negative
impact on capital commitments from taxable investors. If the opposite hypothesis is true, that is the
effect is stronger for the demanders, then the effect
of CAP_GAINS should be more-or-less uniform
across both the sub-groups, since the reduction in
supply would then be a result of falling demand.
The following coefficients were obtained for
CAP_GAINS.
As shown in Table 4, the effect of capital
gains tax rates is more-or-less similar across the two
sub-groups of investors. For every percentage point
increase in the capital gains tax rate, the taxable
commitments go down by approximately 16%, and
the non-taxable commitments go down by roughly
13%3. These results suggest that the demand side
theory is correct and that the entrepreneurs (demanders of venture capital) are more sensitive to changes

in the capital gains tax rate.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this research was to assist in
formulating policies that encourage venture capital. It is clear from the results that capital gains
taxes have a negative impact on venture capital activity. A reduction in the capital gains tax rates
would therefore boost the inflow of funds into the
industry. In addition, this study found that the demand-side effect of capital gains taxes is stronger
than the supply-side effect. Therefore, special attention should be paid to subsidize the entrepreneurs
(the demanders of venture capital). Poterba’s caveat should, however, be kept in mind. Most of the
capital gains taxes collected by the government are
not from capital appreciation resulting from venture investment or entrepreneurship. In fact, venture capital activity generates a rather small percentage of these capital gains. An across-the-board
cut would unfairly benefit the owners of the major
chunk of capital gains income that exists outside
the venture capital industry. Special tax subsidies
that target the industry would likely resolve the issue.
Although R&D spending did not prove to
be too significant, it did have the expected sign.
Also, its p-value went up from 0.45 in the first regression (Table 3) to 0.27 in the second (Table 4).
The variable also was significant in the state-wide
analysis done by Lerner and Gompers. Thus, the
variable shows a lot of promise. It would therefore
be reasonable to suggest increased R&D spending
as a means of increasing venture capital activity,
although further research in this area is still warranted.
In terms of future research on the topic, there are a
number of aspects of this study that can be refined.
The biggest challenge will be the collection of
enough data to derive meaningful results from the
tests. Increasing the number of observations will
significantly improve the reliability of the findings.
Also, a better measure for industry performance can
be used. One possible proxy would be a running
average of the performance of the stocks of the companies that were taken public. This proxy might be
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better at capturing the long-term returns on venture
investments than simply the IPO market price of
these stocks.

Poterba, James. 1989. “Venture Capital and
Capital Gains Taxation.” Tax Policy and the
Economy, edited by Lawrence H. Summers.
MIT Press
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As mentioned before, both the suppliers and the
demanders of venture capital react in a similar fashion to
anticipated returns on investment. Therefore, industry performance affects both the supply of and the demand for venture capital in the same direction.

2

See: ‘Exiting: New Patterns in the 1980’s’, Venture
Capital Journal, August 1998, pp.12-16.

3

Note that the coefficients are provided here for
comparison purposes only. A complete analysis of the funding patterns within the two sub-groups would probably require a more comprehensive study.

